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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 
CONCEPTUALLY SEPARABLE 
ARTISTIC FEATURES POST-STAR 
ATHLETICA:  A USEFUL ARTICLE ON 
USEFUL ARTICLES 
DAAN G. ERIKSON* 
ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Star Athletica v. Varsity 
Brands in 2017, U.S. federal district courts and the Copyright Office Review Board 
have grappled with the Supreme Court’s reimagined conceptual separability test for 
determining the copyrightability of artistic aspects of useful articles.  An 
examination of the decisions in the first eighteen months post-Star Athletica reveals 
district courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance inconsistently, with 
some courts adding language to the test and even using overruled portions of 
previous tests.  The author takes an empirical approach to evaluating such decisions 
and the trends that emerge from them.  The examined range begins at the issuance 
of the Star Athletica decision in March 2017 and ends in mid-October 2018.  
Because courts continue to struggle to define protectable elements of useful articles 
despite the Supreme Court’s guidance, the author proposes that Congress should 
enhance the conceptual separability test in the Next Great Copyright Act.  In the 
meantime, litigants may take some lessons from Star Athletica, such as to examine 
whether the object even constitutes a useful article and to disregard artistic judgment 
and the remainder of a useful object aside from the separable design.  Also, litigants 
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may consider the guidance that emerges from lower court cases, such as the “primary 
function” test from Judge Forrest of the Southern District of New York. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Star Athletica v. 
Varsity Brands in 2017,1 U.S. federal district courts and the Copyright Office 
Review Board (“CORB”) have grappled with the Supreme Court’s 
reimagined conceptual separability test for determining the copyrightability 
of artistic aspects of useful articles. An examination of the decisions in the 
first eighteen months post-Star Athletica reveals that district courts have 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance inconsistently, with some courts 
adding language to the test and even using overruled portions of previous 
tests.2 
Lower courts do not always follow the Supreme Court in intellectual 
property cases.3 While the United States Supreme Court’s Star Athletica 
ruling directed courts on what not to consider in analyzing conceptual 
separability, in the first eighteen months after Star Athletica, with one 
exception, no district court’s issued decision follows the Supreme Court’s 
guidance to the letter of the law.4 
The author’s empirical review of all relevant federal court decisions 
referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in the first eighteen months after 
Star Athletica reveals that some lower courts still use overruled tests or sua 
sponte embellishments. For example, some look to physical separability,5 at 
least one judge has used his own artistic judgment,6 another court has 
embellished the test and looked to whether the “primary purpose” of the 
separable design feature is functional or artistic,7 and another ties in scènes 
à faire analysis of the “genre” of a work.8 
When federal courts and the CORB determine copyrightability, their 
originality analysis closely follows the conceptual separability analysis (i.e., 
is the conceptually separable part of a utilitarian object sufficiently original 
 
 1. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
 2. See infra Section III. 
 3. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 447, 458–59 (2013). 
 4. See infra Section III. 
 5. See, e.g., Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 
Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
 6. See Inhale Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 7. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
28, 2017). 
 8. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 768 n.11 (D.N.J. 2018). 
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to merit copyright protection?),9 though courts can decide separability 
without deciding originality.10 
The Copyright Office typical sets the threshold of originality higher 
than federal courts.11 The author’s empirical review of all relevant CORB 
decisions in the examined time frame post-Star Athletica (March 2017 to 
mid-October 2018) reveals that the CORB grants protection to sufficiently 
original artistic features that readily appear physically separable.12 Cases 
concerning more integrated features present greater challenges to courts and 
the Copyright Office.13 Such cases can result in muddled rulings that lean 
more heavily on the originality analysis than the question of whether the 
features are conceptually separable.14 Also, courts and the CORB also seem 
challenged by two-dimensional, pictorial and graphic works that depict 
useful objects, sometimes mistakenly applying the separability analysis to 
such works.15 
Overall, the author’s analysis reveals that courts continue to struggle 
with conceptual separability despite any clarification from the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Star Athletica. Viewing the examples in the examined period, 
Congress may take up revisions in the Next Great Copyright Act, a 
development envisioned by former Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante,16 
to clarify the conceptual separability test and refine the definition of “useful 
article.”17 The author suggests Congress may incorporate some of the 
 
 9. See infra Sections III and V. 
 10. See, e.g., Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6. 
 11. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines, 
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-of-
copyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal 
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the 
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”). 
 12. See, e.g., Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3 (July 27, 2017); Amaca, CORB Decision at 2 
(July 27, 2017); Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2 (Nov. 28, 2017). 
 13. See, e.g., Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.); Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 
3d at 754; Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018); Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–
3 (Apr. 19, 2018); UR5, CORB Decision (Oct. 23, 2017). 
 14. See, e.g., Ross, 2018 WL 3409988; Silvertop Assocs. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 759; Pendant Lamp 
– 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018); Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018); UR5, 
CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017). 
 15. See, e.g., Ross, 2018 WL 3409988; Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-
MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB 
Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
 16. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013) (the 
author notes he was present to hear Register Pallante deliver her address at the 2013 Horace S. Manges 
Lecture, transcribed in the cited law journal article); see also The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. 
Copyright Law: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop. and the Internet of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4–38 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of 
Copyrights, the U.S. Copyright Office). 
 17. See infra Section V. 
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language a district court judge found helpful to determine if a feature is 
“primarily” functional or artistic.18 
In the meantime, litigants may take some lessons from Star Athletica, 
such as to examine whether the object even constitutes a useful article and 
to disregard artistic judgment and the remainder of a useful object aside from 
the separable design.19 Also, litigants may consider the guidance that 
emerges from lower court cases, such as the “primary function” test from 
Judge Forrest of the Southern District of New York.20 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STAR ATHLETICA DECISION 
A.  Background and Brief History of Conceptual Separability 
Copyright law allows protection for, among other kinds of works, 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.21 However, copyright law does not 
protect useful articles.22 
The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the test for, broadly speaking, 
whether certain decorative features of useful articles could be copyrighted.23 
The test codified the spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mazer v. 
Stein,24 and included some language from the Copyright Office’s regulation 
it promulgated following Mazer.25 
By the time of Star Athletica, different circuit courts and scholars used 
at least nine different tests, with courts in the same circuit sometimes even 
 
 18. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
28, 2017). See Section III(D) infra for further discussion. 
 19. See infra Sections II and V. 
 20. See infra Section III(D). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 22. Id. §§ 101, 113. Also, it remains an open question whether copyright law should protect such 
objects. That said, copyright law does provide sui generis protection for two kinds of useful article, boat 
hulls and semiconductor chip layouts. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. & 901 et seq. Also, when Congress 
revised the Copyright Act in 1976, it declined to enact sui generis protection for “industrial designs.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50, 54–55 (1976). 
 23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 113. 
 24. 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding a statute of a dancer copyrightable notwithstanding the fact 
that it was used as the base of a lamp). In codifying the holding from Mazer, Congress sought to 
“encompass all original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been 
embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and 
the potential availability of design patent protection.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976). Further 
discussion of other areas of intellectual property that may protect non-functional aspects of useful articles 
falls outside the scope of this article. 
 25. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact 
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape 
of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representations, 
which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features 
will be eligible for registration.”). 
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diverging, as courts struggled with the best language to protect creators of 
various useful articles that featured decorative elements.26 
Congress and the Copyright Office have historically considered 
clothing a useful article.27 Accordingly, copyright law cannot protect the cut 
or style of clothing, though it can protect patterns.28 
Star Athletica concerned whether the designs on cheerleading uniforms 
were conceptually separable from the useful article such that the designs 
could be protectable under copyright law. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to clarify the proper test.29 
B. Back to the Statute? The Supreme Court’s Test 
Justice Thomas authored the opinion of the court, which also included 
Justices Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan.30 Justice Ginsburg 
concurred;31 Justice Breyer dissented and Justice Kennedy joined Justice 
Breyer’s dissent.32 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held: 
 
[A]n artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for 
copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or 
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) 
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately 
from the useful article.33 
 
Justice Thomas’s two-part test closely mirrors the language of the statute: 
 
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only 
to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
 
 26. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 779 F.3d 468, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing various tests). 
 27. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991); U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017); see 
also 11 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 924.3(A) (2018). 
 28. COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 618.4(C). 
 29. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (Mem) (2016). 
 30. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
 31. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 32. Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 1016. 
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capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.34 
 
The small differences in language are perhaps negligible, for example, 
Justice Thomas’s “can be perceived” as compared with the statute’s “can be 
identified.” The Supreme Court’s new test adds some language about the 
artistic feature qualifying as a “protectable” pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
(“PGS”)35 work if “imagined separately” rather than that the examined 
features merely must be “capable of existing independently” from “the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.” 
Query whether and how a design could meet the second prong, 
qualifying as a “protectable” PGS work, and simultaneously not satisfy the 
statutory originality requirement.36 Apparently, the Supreme Court saw no 
confusion on the point since it declined to express an opinion on originality 
and “any other prerequisite of a valid copyright” in the case, indicating that 
the separability test does not contemplate such matters.37 
Also, as quoted above, one part of the Supreme Court’s opinion holds 
“an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright 
protection if the feature [meets the two-part test],”38 while another part of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion prefaced its test with language that “a feature 
incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright 
protection only if the feature . . . [meets the two-part test].”39 In other words, 
in the first instance, separability may be sufficient to an artistic aspect of a 
useful article’s qualifying for copyright protection, but in the second 
instance, separability is necessary, but not sufficient. In light of the Supreme 
Court’s comments on declining to express an opinion on other prerequisites 
of a valid copyright, notwithstanding the somewhat confusing and 
contradictory language, courts and litigants may consider separability 
necessary but not sufficient to copyrightability and may consider the 
originality analysis completely separate from the separability test. 
In the author’s opinion, the most useful guidance in Star Athletica lies 
in that the Supreme Court overruled previous tests and explicitly rejected 
certain considerations, as discussed below.40 
 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 35. The Supreme Court abbreviates “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” as “PGS.” 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works 
of authorship . . . .”) 
 37. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1012 n.1. 
 38. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added). 
 40. See infra Section II(D). 
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C.  Concurrence and Dissent 
Due to the complicated history of the conceptual separability test and 
the struggles courts continue to face, the Star Athletica concurrence and 
dissent merit brief discussion. 
1. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence emphasized that the Court need not 
have opined on conceptual separability at all.41 She noted that the registered 
designs are two-dimensional works “reproduced on useful articles” not 
“designs of useful articles.”42 In other words, “[b]ecause the owner of a 
copyright in a pre-existing PGS work may exclude a would-be infringer from 
reproducing that work on a useful article, there is no need to engage in any 
separability inquiry to resolve” the case.43 To support her claim, Justice 
Ginsburg reproduced copies of Varsity Brands’s copyright applications as 
an appendix to her opinion, showing that Varsity Brands filed to register its 
designs as “2-dimensional artwork” and more specifically in some cases as 
“fabric design (artwork).”44 
Despite Justice Ginsburg’s keen observations, no lower court in the 
examined time period incorporated her analysis into an opinion. Yet her 
guidance reminds future litigants to consider the nature of the works at issue 
carefully. Courts should view her remarks as a reminder of the doctrine’s 
subject matter limitations.45 
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy, writing about cat 
lamps and shovels as art.46 Of course, in light of the majority’s new test, it 
does not matter if a cat lamp base statue holds up the lamp or not, because 
the clarified test ignores the remainder of the object left behind, and only 
looks at the registrability of the conceptually separable portion. 
 
 41. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 1019–29. 
 45. See id. at 1019 (“In short, Varsity’s designs are not themselves useful articles meet for 
separability determination under § 101; they are standalone PGS works that may gain copyright protection 
as such, including the exclusive right to reproduce the designs on useful articles.”) But see, e.g., Glass 
Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018) 
(referencing Star Athletica in connection with a computer model work); see infra Section III(H) for 
further analysis of Glass Egg Dig. Media; see also infra Sections III(G)(2), IV(C)(3). 
 46. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Some district courts do wrestle with Justice Breyer’s concerns about art 
anyway.47 However, the question is not whether a shovel can be art. Before 
performing the separability analysis involving an assessment of whether a 
feature “can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art,” the 
test requires examining only the “artistic feature” separate from the overall 
useful article.48 Relatedly, copyright law in its current form cannot protect 
many aesthetically pleasing articles where form and function cannot be 
separated even conceptually.49 
D. Takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Holding 
The Supreme Court issued significant guidance about what courts, the 
Copyright Office, and litigants should and should not consider with regard 
to determining the copyrightability of decorative portions of useful articles. 
After removing the conceptually separable design, a useful article need not 
remain.50 Courts and the Copyright Office now need focus only on any 
separable part, not any “left behind” parts. Further, Justice Thomas 
abrogated any distinction between physical separability and conceptual 
separability, holding conceptual separability covers all considerations.51 
Justice Thomas also confirmed that courts cannot consider artistic judgment 
(neither the artist’s purpose nor the judge’s view of marketability).52 
To be clear, the Supreme Court’s test reverberates far beyond the 
reaches of fashion law, though the Supreme Court made sure to confirm that 
the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of clothing are still not eligible for 
copyright.53 
 
E. District Court Decision Dismissing Counterclaims and Complaint 
The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the copyrightability 
of the cheerleading uniform designs, leaving any evaluation of originality to 
the district court.54 The district court reopened the case to resolve any 
 
 47. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 
4163990 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 48. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1016. 
 49. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 50. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1013–14. 
 51. Id. at 1013. 
 52. Id. at 1015. 
 53. Id. at 1016. 
 54. Id. at 1012 n.1. 
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remaining issues, such as whether the designs at issue in the case were 
protected by copyright.55 
In reopening the case, the district court avoided answering the question 
of originality.56 Star Athletica had counterclaimed that Varsity’s designs 
were unoriginal such that copyright law could not protect them.57 However, 
instead of determining whether such designs satisfied the originality 
requirement and could be protected, the district court characterized the 
counterclaim as an affirmative defense, which it could review in its 
discretion under precedent, but which it chose not to review.58 
Therefore, the district court dismissed the remaining counterclaims 
without deciding if the designs on the cheerleading uniforms met the 
threshold of originality required to merit copyright protection.59 In an 
unusual move, the district court allowed the plaintiff to settle the case with 
the defendant’s insurance company, over the defendant’s objections.60 
Accordingly, while we have a new test for conceptual separability, we do not 
have new guidance on whether such simple designs constitute copyrightable 
expression. 
III. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AFTER STAR ATHLETICA 
To review lower court interpretations in the first eighteen months post-
Star Athletica, the author looked to those cases from March 2017 to mid-
October 2018 that quoted the decision and involved at least a purported 
useful article, and also examined any later developments in the Star Athletica 
case specifically. 
Eight relevant federal court opinions in the examined period post-Star 
Athletica cite the Supreme Court’s decision regarding its new test for the 
conceptual separability analysis. Of the eight relevant decisions, the first in 
time is dicta,61 the second mirrors the Supreme Court’s language,62 the third 
 
 55. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., No. 10-02508, 2017 WL 3446292, at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 10, 2017). 
 56. Id. at *2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at *1–3. 
 59. Id. at *3. 
 60. Id. at *1–3; see also Bill Donohue, Weird Cheerleader Copyright Settlement Finalized, LAW360 
(June 20, 2018, 10:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1055819. 
 61. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at 
*2–3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 62. Design Ideas, Inc. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. June 
20, 2017). 
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addresses the issue in a spoken order entering a default judgment,63 the fourth 
addresses conceptual separability but not originality at summary judgment,64 
the fifth remains ongoing as of this writing and does not include significant 
substantive evaluation of conceptual separability,65 the sixth contains 
extensive separability analysis,66 the seventh contains a brief separability 
analysis,67 and the eighth cites Star Athletica as the lodestar for separability 
analysis but does not appear to involve a useful article and contains no 
substantive analysis of useful articles.68 In the examined time frame, five of 
the six issued opinions that do substantively evaluate conceptual separability 
include language not found in the Supreme Court’s test,69 perhaps indicating 
the need for courts to supplement or augment the Supreme Court’s guidance. 
A. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. 
1. Background 
Judge Wright of the Central District of California heard a motion to 
reconsider from plaintiff Inhale, Inc., requesting that the court reopen the 
case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Star Athletica.70 
Previously, the Central District of California and the Ninth Circuit 
found that the shape of the hookah water container and its function were not 
conceptually separable and thus the water container was not copyrightable: 
“the shape of a container is not independent of the container’s utilitarian 
function.”71 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.72 
 
 63. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498 
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
 64. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 2017). 
 65. See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268, 
at *6 n.6 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017). 
 66. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 762–65 (D.N.J. 2018). 
 67. Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.). 
 68. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 
 69. See Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017); Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., 
Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017); Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 
3726756, at *6; Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65; Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *4. 
 70. See Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *1. 
 71. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’g No. 2:11-cv-
03838-ODW(FFMx), 2012 WL 2321573, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012). 
 72. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 758 (Mem) (2014). 
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On the motion for rehearing, Judge Wright denied the motion to 
reconsider.73 “At some point, all cases must end. Inhale does not seem to 
understand this, as it moves to reopen this proceeding five years after the 
Court’s initial case dispositive summary judgment order, and approximately 
three years after its unsuccessful appeals to the Ninth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court.”74 The emphasized language indicates things did not look 
good for Inhale. 
The court then indicated that Inhale did not cite any relevant, binding 
authority from non-habeas civil cases where the courts reopened the cases 
based on a change in the law years after a final decision and exhaustion of 
the appeals process.75 The court distinguished and was not persuaded by 
persuasive authority.76 
The court declined to reconsider the case under the rationale that to do 
so “would seriously undermine the finality of judgments and open the 
floodgates of litigation by encouraging any disgruntled litigant to file a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion if they believe there has been even a tangentially-related 
change in law.”77 
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
Analysis 
Following Judge Wright’s denial of the motion to reconsider, Judge 
Wright authored significant conceptual separability analysis based on the 
Supreme Court’s test in Star Athletica. “Alternatively, the Court denies 
Inhale’s motion because application of the Star Athletica test would not 
change the outcome of the underlying proceeding.”78 However, all of his 
analysis amounts to dicta in light of his denial of the motion to reconsider. 
Judge Wright correctly noted that the U.S. Supreme Court “explicitly 
abrogated a number of other tests, including the physical separability test and 
the designer’s perspective test, each of which factored into this Court’s 
original decision.”79 He went on to criticize Inhale for claiming copyright in 
the water container as a whole and not any subset of its features,80 
 
 73. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 74. Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at *2. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *3 (“Inhale fails to point out a sculptural feature of the water container or a subset of 
features of the water container that may serve as the predicate for application of the Star Athletica test; it 
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notwithstanding the fact that Inhale owned a copyright registration for the 
water container as a sculptural work.81 See Inhale’s hookah water container 






















The court noted, “Inhale lost the ability to claim that the water container 
as a whole constitutes a piece of ‘modern sculpture,’ a ‘museum piece’ or 
‘standalone’ work of art when it agreed in the underlying proceeding that the 
water container was a useful article.”83 However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that artistic judgment and intent is irrelevant;84 therefore whether Inhale 
claimed the water container as a “modern sculpture” or “museum piece” 
appears irrelevant. Further, legislative history shows that Congress intended 
to disregard “factors such as mass production” and “commercial 
exploitation” in determining the availability of copyright protection for PGS 
works.85 
 
seeks protection not for any particular feature of the water container but for the way the features as a 
whole ‘are arranged to form [the] hookah water container.’”). 
 81. Complaint at Ex. A, Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW(FFMx), 
2012 WL 2321573 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012). 
 82. Id. at Ex. C.  
 83. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 84. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017). 
 85. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50, 54 (1976). 
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The court then stated it was left to determine if “any of the water 
container’s features individually, or a subset of those features” could be 
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful 
article.86 Judge Wright wrote that they could not be, as “they are essentially 
geometric shapes of the most common type.”87 
“Combining two or three of these common geometric shapes together 
does little to improve the situation–the components of the water container at 
issue are simply not works of art in even the broadest, most liberal sense.”88 
Judge Wright cited to Copyright Office’s restrictive language in the 
Compendium II.89 However, while the Star Athletica test does include the 
wording “work of art,” the Supreme Court rejected artistic judgment as part 
of the separability analysis, implying the test targets instead the distinction 
between utilitarian and non-utilitarian features.90 Further, the author submits 
that it may be open for discussion whether the hookah water container is only 
a combination of common shapes, or whether nearly anything on the planet, 
for that matter, is arguably composed of a combination of common shapes. 
Judge Wright went on to opine, “This is not to say that there are not 
some, if not many, useful articles composed of unique geometric shapes 
variations or unique combinations of geometric shapes that might pass 
muster under the Star Athletica test.”91 While Judge Wright cited to the 
Compendium II, his assessment still amounts only to dicta. “It is only to say 
that the water container at issue here is no Noguchi Table.”92 The judge 





 86. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 
§ 503.02(a) (2d ed. 1984) as “indicating that ‘common’ geometric shapes by themselves are not 
copyrightable”). 
 90. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017). 
 91. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3 (emphasis in original). 
 92. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3. 
 93. Id. 
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Query, what is conceptually separable about a Noguchi table apart from 
its useful parts? The author posits that the judge’s opinion smacks of high art 
artistic judgment, not allowed by Star Athletica, and that the judge rejected 
copyrightability here at least in part due to the pedestrian nature of the 
product.94 
Judge Wright would do well to remember Justice Holmes’s wise words 
concerning another type of copyrightable work, quoted also by the Supreme 
Court in Star Athletica, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth 
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”95 
B. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc. 
1. Background 
Plaintiff Design Ideas, Ltd. brought suit against the various defendants 
in the Central District of Illinois, alleging copyright infringement of its 
“sparrow clip” clothespins.96 See plaintiff’s work below on top and 
defendants’ on the bottom.97 
 
 94. Cf. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming judgment of 
“Uncle Sam” toy bank as insufficiently original to merit copyright protection). 
 95. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Star Athletica, 
L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1015 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251). 
 96. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 
20, 2017). In the interest of full disclosure, the author notes that his law firm participated in representing 
the defendants in this case at the time of the June 20, 2017 decision. Accordingly, the author does not 
comment on the decision beyond the short factual description contained herein. 
 97. Complaint at 4, 10, 12, Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, 
at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 20, 2017). 
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Before the Supreme Court decided Star Athletica, Judge Myerscough 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.98 She found that 
the sparrow clip design qualified for copyright protection as it was original 
and that “the bird design was both physically and conceptually separable 
from the utilitarian aspect of the work.”99 
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability Analysis 
Judge Myerscough’s decision here did not change in any material way 
after Star Athletica, finding that the bird portion of the sparrow clip met both 
prongs of the Supreme Court’s test, mirroring the language exactly.100 
 
 98. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2016 WL 4487830, at *15 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 
25, 2016). 
 99. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 
20, 2017) (citing Design Ideas, Ltd., 2016 WL 4487830, at *15). 
 100. Id. at *2–3 (“First, the bird portion can be perceived as a three-dimensional work of art separate 
from the useful article. One can identify the bird portion as having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
qualities. Second, the bird portion would qualify as a protectable sculptural work on its own if it were 
imaged separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated. The bird portion would be eligible 
for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it been originally fixed in some 
tangible medium other than attached to the clothespin.”) 
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Then, she rejected the defendants’ arguments that the bird portion of 
the sparrow clip is itself useful, stating poetically and rhetorically, “once the 
bird portion is removed from the clothespin, what is the usefulness of 
hanging the bird from a rod or hanging the bird on a string by its beak?”101 
She cited and quoted the Compendium III for the proposition that “a 
sculpture does not become a useful article simply because it could be used 
as a doorstop or a paperweight.”102 
C. Triangl Group Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui District Lingzhi 
Garment Co., Ltd. 
1. Background 
Triangl Group, a purveyor of women’s swimwear, filed suit in the 
Southern District of New York against the various defendants for copying 
the black T-shaped designs featured on bikini tops and black trim featured 
on the bikini tops and bottoms, alleging copyright, trademark, and trade dress 
infringement.103 
In fact, Triangl Group noted in its complaint that not only had the 
defendants copied its designs and sold nearly identical bikinis under a 
different mark and company name at a cheaper price, but the defendants also 
copied Triangl Group’s actual online catalog photographs and reproduced 











 101. Id. at *3. The author credits Thomas Kjellberg of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. for his 
interpretation of Judge Myerscough’s words as beat poetry at the Copyright Society of the USA’s Annual 
Meeting in June 2018. 
 102. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 
924.1 (3d ed. revised Dec. 22, 2014)). Judge Myerscough quoted the then-current edition of the 
Compendium III; the Copyright Office subsequently amended the Compendium III and removed this 
language in a revision dated September 29, 2017. 
 103. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498 
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
 104. Complaint at 3, Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 
16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
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Plaintiff’s website with its bikini design appears above on the left and 
defendants’ website appears above on the right.105 The defendants essentially 
defaulted.106 In an order issued from the bench, Judge Gardephe granted 
plaintiff Triangl Group Limited’s application for default judgment and a 
permanent injunction based on copyright, trademark, and trade dress 
infringement.107 
2.  Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
Analysis 
In finding copyright infringement, Judge Gardephe held: 
 
Here plaintiffs have properly alleged that the images of their products 
at issue are copyrightable works owned by plaintiffs, and in light of 
Star Athletica, it appears most of plaintiffs’ designs are copyrightable 
because the decorative black trim and T-shape are physically 
separable and demonstrable as works of art as shown in Exhibits 2 
and 10 to the Complaint.108 
 
The author finds two technical errors with the holding. First, the judge 
used the language “physically separable,” but, as discussed above, the 
Supreme Court abrogated the “physically separable” part of the test. Going 
forward, the test only inquires whether the feature is conceptually separable 
(though query whether any physically separable feature is not also 
conceptually separable). 
 
 105. Id. at 15–16. 
 106. Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *4. 
 107. Id. at *11. 
 108. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
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Second, the court never examined in detail whether the black trim and 
T-shape were sufficiently original to merit copyright protection. Perhaps 
misreading the Star Athletica decision, which never determined the 
originality of the cheerleading uniform designs (and even the district court 
did not, as discussed above),109 the court here presumed “most of plaintiff’s 
designs are copyrightable because the decorative black trim and T-shape are 
physically separable and demonstrable as works of art.”110 
However, as discussed above,111 just because a feature “(1) can be 
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful 
article” (i.e., meets the first prong) and “(2) would qualify as a protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other 
medium if imagined separately from the useful article” (i.e., meets the 
second prong) does not mean it is copyrightable; it only means that it is 
separable.112 
Further, in using only the shorthand that Triangl Group’s designs were 
“demonstrable as works of art,” language that tracks closely to the first half 
of the Supreme Court’s test, the court’s analysis omitted the second half of 
the Supreme Court’s test. 
Query, if defendants had not defaulted, could they have argued that the 
works were not original? Could they have argued that the works did not meet 
the threshold of originality because the designs were just “common 
geometric shapes,” using the language of the Compendium III?113 
Due to Triangl Group’s success on the trademark and trade dress 
claims, perhaps the outcome would not change. Moreover, the court could 
have heeded Justice Ginsburg’s view of the designs on the bikinis as 
copyrightable two-dimensional images (not “designs of useful articles” but 
rather “pictorial or graphic works reproduced on useful articles”), or found 
infringement based on copying just the photographs. In any event, the court 
granted a default judgment and permanent injunction.114 Finally, it is worth 
noting that in the judge’s efforts to do justice and stop free riders, the judge 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s test in a manner that favored plaintiffs at 
least in part due to his omission of any originality analysis. 
 
 109. See supra Section II(E). 
 110. Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *8. 
 111. See supra Section II(B). 
 112. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
 113. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 906.1 (3d ed. 
2017). 
 114. Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *11. 
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D. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc. 
1.  Background 
In another case in the Southern District of New York, Jetmax Limited 
brought suit against Big Lots, Inc. and other defendants, alleging the 
defendants infringed Jetmax’s copyright in a strand of twinkle lights covered 
with wire-wrapped bulb covers (the “Tear Drop Light Set”).115 The 
defendants’ work (the “Advance Light Set”) also consisted of a strand of 
twinkle lights covered with wire-wrapped bulb covers, though it differed in 
some respects. “The Advance Light Set does not contain an ornamental 









The plaintiff’s product appears on the left and the defendants’ on the 
right.117 Jetmax moved for summary judgment on its copyright 
infringement claim.118 Here, the defendants challenged Jetmax in arguing 
“that the Tear Drop Light Set is not copyrightable because it is a useful 
article and because it lacks originality.”119 Defendants filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment.120 
 
 115. See Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 2017). 
 116. Id. at *2. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at *1. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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Judge Forrest denied both Jetmax’s motion for summary judgment and 
the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, ruling that Jetmax’s 
Tear Drop Light Set contained conceptually separable elements, though the 
court reserved judgment on whether such elements were sufficiently 
original.121 
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
Analysis 
In finding that Jetmax’s Tear Drop Light Set contained conceptually 
separable elements, Judge Forrest held: 
 
Here, the parties do not dispute that the Tear Drop Light Set is a 
useful article insofar as it serves the ‘intrinsic utilitarian function’ of 
providing light to a room. Rather, the parties strongly disagree 
regarding whether the Tear Drop Light Set contains artistic elements 
that are sufficiently separable in order to merit copyright protection. 
Having carefully considered this question, the Court finds that the 
Tear Drop Light Set does contain artistic elements—the decorative 
covers—that can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.122 
 
Here, the court’s language duplicated the Supreme Court’s test from 
Star Athletica almost exactly, but the court substitutes language from the 
statute for part two instead of the language from the Supreme Court (in the 
court’s opinion, part one, “can be perceived,” is the Supreme Court’s 
language,123 while part two, “capable of existing independently,” comes 
from the statute).124 
While closely following the Supreme Court’s test, and also mirroring 
the statute, Judge Forrest added an enhancement to the test not found in either 
Star Athletica or the statute: 
 
The decorative covers are sculptural works that are capable of 
existing apart from the utilitarian aspect of the light set, i.e. the light 
bulbs and other components that cause the Tear Drop Light Set to 
light a room. The primary purpose of the cover is artistic; once the 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 123. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
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covers are removed, the remainder is a functioning but unadorned 
light string.125 
 
The Supreme Court never required that the “primary purpose” of the 
conceptually separable feature be “artistic.” However, the Supreme Court’s 
test does include the term “artistic” in that it calls for analyzing an “artistic 
feature.”126 
The author notes that Judge Forrest’s “primary purpose” test evokes but 
does not replicate the “Primary-Subsidiary Approach” from Kieselstein-
Cord,127 as the tests differ in significant respects. In Kieselstein-Cord, the 
court ignored the functionality of the belt buckle as a whole and did not look 
to any separable aspects. Here, Judge Forrest examined the decorative covers 
as separate from the utilitarian light strand. 
Where the decorative covers adorn a functional light strand that “serves 
the ‘intrinsic utilitarian function’” of “providing light to a room,” she 
identified the decorative covers as “capable of existing independently of” the 
utilitarian light strand.128 Judge Forrest’s language meshes nicely with that 
of the statute, which dictates, “[a]n article that is normally part of a useful 
article is considered a ‘useful article.’”129 Here, the decorative covers are not 
normally part of providing light to a room. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s test holds no concern for the leftover 
portion of the useful article. Judge Forrest did explicitly recognize this part 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in a footnote to her opinion: 
 
Even if the covers reduce glare and serve some utilitarian function, 
the Supreme Court explained that the imagined remainder of the 
article “left behind” once the pictorial, graphical, or sculptural 
element is removed need not “be a fully functioning useful article at 
all, much less an equally useful one.” 130 
 
 
 125. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
 126. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1016 (“an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is 
eligible for copyright protection if . . .”). 
 127. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding 
“[t]he primary ornamental aspect of” the belt buckle works at issue “conceptually separable from their 
subsidiary utilitarian function”). The Sixth Circuit titled the Kieselstein-Cord test as the “Primary-
Subsidiary Approach” in Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 128. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *4. 
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 130. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 n.2 (citation omitted). 
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Though conceding that the decorative covers “serve some utilitarian 
function,”131 the court nevertheless held that they “can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects” of the useful article.132 
After examining the conceptual separability issue, Judge Forrest wrote 
that the Tear Drop Light likely meets the threshold of originality, but 
reserved judgment on the issue of originality because she said genuine 
disputes of material fact existed.133 
While not strictly following the Supreme Court, Judge Forrest’s 
“primary function” language provides interesting and key guidance to 
creators, copyright owners, and future litigants. The test conjures a modified 
version of Carol Barnhart134–the court interprets the artistic features as 
separate from the utilitarian function of the overall article–but in a twist, due 
to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Star Athletica, Judge Forrest’s test 
recognizes that a functioning useful article need not remain after separating 
the artistic features. Judge Forrest’s test in Jetmax provides that a decorative 
or artistic feature of a useful article may be conceptually separable, despite 
having some utilitarian function, so long as its primary function is not 
utilitarian, which may be evident by a utilitarian element left behind. 
E. Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Construction Toys, Inc. 
1. Background 
Lego filed suit in the District of Connecticut against the defendants for 
copyright infringement of its figurines.135 See below. 
 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *6 (quoting Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017)). 
 133. Id. at *6. As in Star Athletica, the court ruled on the issue of conceptual separability, but not 
originality. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). 
 134. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding mannequins of 
partial human torsos to be utilitarian articles without any separable, copyrightable features). The Sixth 
Circuit titled the Carol Barnhart test the “Objectively Necessary Approach,” describing its holding as, 
“[a] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature is conceptually separable if the artistic features of the design 
are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article.” Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star 
Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 135. See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268, 
at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017). 
  














Best-Lock’s figure is on the left and Lego’s figure is on the right in each 
image above.136 As of this writing, the case remains ongoing, though Judge 
Haight issued an opinion in a discovery dispute that references and interprets 
Star Athletica.137 
 
 136. Complaint at 3, Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 
6540268 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017). 
 137. Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6. 
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2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
Analysis 
The defendants moved to defer consideration of Lego’s motion for 
partial summary judgment and moved to compel production of documents, 
depositions, and supplemental interrogatory responses.138 In ruling on the 
discovery dispute, Judge Haight recognized that the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Star Athletica means certain considerations do not apply in a conceptual 
separability analysis.139 
In denying defendants’ motion, Judge Haight wrote: 
 
Best-Lock does not explain how discovery as to what Lego 
considered protectable is relevant to Lego’s motion for summary 
judgment on the copyright infringement claim. Indeed, Best-Lock’s 
position appears contrary to that expressed recently in Star Athletica, 
L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017), where 
the Supreme Court noted that in determining whether the design of a 
useful article is eligible for copyright, the “inquiry is limited to how 
the article and feature are perceived, not how or why they were 
designed.” (citing Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 
834 F.2d 1142, 1152 (2d Cir. 1982)). Thus, Lego’s argument that the 
“scope” of the copyrights would be determined by the registrations 
and deposit materials, already in the record, is well founded. Best-
Lock offers nothing persuasive to the contrary.140 
 
As in Star Athletica, artistic motivation does not influence 
copyrightability. How or why Lego designed its works does not matter. 
Going even further, Judge Haight held that what the plaintiff considered 
protectable does not matter.141 The court can decide what is protectable.142 
Judge Haight’s opinion differs somewhat from the Inhale case, where 
the judge there examined how the plaintiff claimed copyright in the hookah 
water container as a whole and the judge criticized the plaintiff for not 
identifying what features it considered conceptually separable from the work 
as a whole.143 Lego claimed the “copyrighted Minifigure comprises, in whole 
or in part, wholly original works of authorship that are copyrightable subject 
 
 138. Id. at *2. 
 139. See id. at *6 n.6; see also supra Section II(D). 
 140. Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6. 
 141. See id. at *6. 
 142. See id. at *7 n.7. 
 143. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
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matter” and that the defendant’s work “is strikingly and substantially similar 
to the Minifigure Copyrights.”144 In other words, Lego did not claim the 
defendant infringed any particular subset of the figurine, though it noted the 
torso, head, arms, legs, and feet of the allegedly infringing figurine featured 
the same dimensions as the Minifigure, in essence claiming copyright in the 
whole and all of the parts.145 
Interestingly, Judge Haight is not new to the conceptual separability 
analysis. Judge Haight served as the district court judge in the Brandir case, 
where the Second Circuit affirmed his opinion on the non-copyrightability 
of the bicycle rack (though the Second Circuit reversed his opinion on the 
trademark claim in that case). As shown above, Judge Haight even cited the 
Supreme Court’s citation of the Brandir case, specifically, the Second 
Circuit’s affirmance of his opinion. 
F. Silvertop Associates, Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc. 
1. Background 
Silvertop Associates, Inc. d/b/a Rasta Imposta filed suit in the District 
of New Jersey against defendant Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc. for copyright 













 144. Complaint at 2–4, Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 
WL 6540268 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017). 
 145. Id. The author notes that toys, when they are not mere copies of a useful article, may be 
considered sculptural works. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES §§ 313.4(A), 503.1(B) (3d ed. revised Sept. 29, 2017). However, it may be an open question 
whether portions of a toy that fit together with other pieces might be considered useful. 
 146. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (D.N.J. 2018). 
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The plaintiff’s work appears at left and the center and right images show 
the defendant’s works.147 By way of background, the court notes that the 
founder of Kangaroo previously worked for a company that had a business 
relationship with Rasta Imposta to sell Rasta Imposta’s banana costume.148 
Rasta Imposta filed a motion for preliminary injunction.149 
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
Analysis 
The court noted that it was the first in the Third Circuit to interpret the 
Supreme Court’s Star Athletica ruling.150 As a preliminary matter, the court 
briefly described how costumes, including the costume at issue, are useful 
articles not generally protectable by copyright.151 However, as the court 
recognized, certain features of costumes can be protectable.152 The court 
quoted the Star Athletica two-part test.153 
Turning to the banana costume at issue, the court acknowledged Rasta 
Imposta’s claims of certain “unique features of the banana design” as 
copyrightable: “the overall shape and cutout holes of the costume, the black 
ends of the banana, and the vertical lines running down the middle of the 
banana.”154 The court held that the costume’s armholes were not protectable, 
as they “perform a solely utilitarian function” of allowing a person to wear 
the costume.155 
Then, the court discussed how it found other features of the costume, 
taken as a whole and not dissecting into individual components, protectable 
under copyright law.156 Quoting a Third Circuit decision involving sculptural 
works resembling rocks or stones inscribed with a verse, Judge Hillman 
identified “the combination of texture, color, size and shape” as relevant.157 
Unlike the armholes, Judge Hillman found that “the other features of the 
 
 147. Complaint at 2, Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754 (D.N.J. 
2018). 
 148. Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 760. 
 149. Id. at 759. 
 150. Id. at 762 n.4. 
 151. Id. at 762 (quoting Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 670–71 (3d. Cir. 
1990) (“[A] costume . . . may serve, aside from its appearance, to clothe the wearer . . . .”)). 
 152. See id. at 763. 
 153. Id. at 762–63. 
 154. Id. at 763. 
 155. Id. at 764. 
 156. Id. at 764–65. 
 157. Id. at 764 (quoting Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2005)). The 
Kay Berry decision contains no discussion of useful articles. 
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Banana Costume can be identified separately from and are capable of 
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects.”158 
The court found Rasta Imposta’s registration certificate persuasive, and 
further, the court stated it “can easily identify the features of the Banana 
Costume having a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural quality.”159 The court 
listed the numerous features: 
 
a) the overall length of the costume, b) the overall shape of the design 
in terms of curvature, c) the length of the shape both above and below 
the torso of the wearer, d) the shape, size, and jet black color of both 
ends, e) the location of the head and arm cutouts which dictate how 
the costume drapes on and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to 
the mere existence of the cutout holes), f) the soft, smooth, almost 
shiny look and feel of the chosen synthetic fabric, g) the parallel lines 
which mimic the ridges on a banana in three-dimensional form, and 
h) the bright shade of a golden yellow and uniform color that appears 
distinct from the more muted and inconsistent tones of a natural 
banana.160 
 
Judge Hillman held that “if these features were separated from the 
costume itself and applied on a painter’s canvas, it would qualify as a two-
dimensional work of art in a way that would not replicate the costume 
itself.”161 Query whether nearly anything applied on a painter’s canvas might 
become a “work of art.” 
Next, the court discussed the merger and scènes à faire doctrines.162 The 
court found merger did not apply because Rasta Imposter provided twenty-
one examples of banana costumes available in the marketplace “that are 
easily distinguished from Rasta Imposta’s design . . . .”163 The court listed 
numerous ways that banana costumes might differ in appearance.164 
As for scènes à faire, the court implied there is no such thing as scènes 
à faire with regard to banana costumes because there is no commonly 
recognized expression of a banana costume “genre.”165 In contrast, the court 
 
 158. Id. at 764. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 764–65. 
 161. Id. at 765. 
 162. Id. at 766–68, 768 n.11. 
 163. Id. at 768. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 765 n.6, 768 n.11. 
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implies the existence of a public consensus of what an American 
cheerleading costume looks like.166 
While acknowledging Rasta Imposta’s relatively limited scope of 
rights, the court granted the preliminary injunction due to Rasta Imposta’s 
“reasonable likelihood of providing ‘near identity’ of the costumes and that 
the copyright relates to protectable material.”167 
The defendant filed an appeal to the Third Circuit on June 11, 2018, 
which is still pending as of this writing.168 
The author submits that the appeal should address, at least, what or 
whether any “left behind” parts remain after separability. As currently 
envisioned by Judge Hillman, it appears that the only utilitarian features of 
the costume are the armholes.169 Yet the armholes, being holes, are not a 
physical part of the costume but merely an absence of fabric or essentially 
negative space. The author finds it difficult to consider negative space as a 
“left behind” part of a utilitarian object. 
Without any left behind parts, the Third Circuit should find the entire 
costume functional as a whole. In Star Athletica, the Supreme Court held 
that designs on the cheerleading uniform were separable from the underlying 
uniform.170 The author posits that it is difficult to see how the Third Circuit 
could affirm the district court’s holding using the district court’s reasoning, 
as the costume’s features Judge Hillman identified (color, shape, parallel 
lines, texture and appearance of the fabric) constitute the entire costume and 
accordingly are not separable from any underlying utilitarian object. 
However, if the Third Circuit would identify a more limited set of separable, 
copyrightable features, then the Third Circuit could potentially affirm the 
holding under different reasoning. 
A prior version of the Compendium III, describing registration 
standards of the Copyright Office, precluded registration of costumes 
without “two- or three-dimensional design elements that are separable from 
the costume itself . . . .”171 The prior version of the Compendium III advised: 
 
 166. Id. at 765 n.6 (describing “the iconic outfit of an American cheerleader”); but see Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866), 2016 WL 5116853 (discussing “decorations evocative of 
cheerleading are not immutable, but have evolved over time” and reproducing the Norman Rockwell 
image Cheerleaders from 1952, showing three cheerleaders in outfits quite different from those produced 
by Star Athletica and Varsity Brands). 
 167.  Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 768. 
 168. Appeal of Petitioner-Appellant, Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., No. 18-2266 (3d 
Cir. June 11, 2018). 
 169. See Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764. 
 170. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017). 
 171. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.3(B) (3d 
ed. revised Dec. 22, 2014). 
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[t]he fact that a costume may be intended primarily for ornamentation 
and show, and secondarily for covering the body, does not change 
the fact that a costume is a useful article. Whole- or partial-body 
costumes are considered useful articles and are subject to the 
separability test, even if they depict a person or thing, or illustrate 
cultural, historical, or occupational garb or dress.172 
 
However, the present version of the Compendium III no longer contains 
the above guidance, including only a reproduction of the Star Athletica test 
along with a note that the Copyright Office is developing updated guidance 
and will update the Compendium when it finalizes its guidance.173 
While numerous other cases pre-Star Athletica addressed the 
copyrightability of costumes, the author leaves aside further discussion of 
the copyrightability of costumes or aspects of costumes, awaiting word from 
the Copyright Office on Compendium III revisions and from the Third 
Circuit on the banana costume a-peel. 
G. Ross v. Apple, Inc. 
1. Background 
Pro se plaintiff Thomas S. Ross filed suit in the Southern District of 
Florida against Apple, Inc., alleging copyright infringement of his plans for 







 172. Id. § 924.3(A)(2). 
 173. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924 (3d ed. 
revised Sept. 29, 2017). Interestingly, the same section now omits a blanket rule that the Copyright Office 
considers clothing uncopyrightable, though Section 311.1 of the current version of the Compendium III 
still references the Copyright Office’s policy against registering copyright protection in clothing. See also 
Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991). 
 174. Complaint at 1, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 8808769 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 30, 2016). 
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Ross’s drawing appears at left and an image of an Apple iPhone device 
appears at right.175 Ross alleged that he created the above drawing and other 
similar plans for devices in 1992 and registered protection in the drawings in 
2014.176 Some of his other copyright applications in suit refer to dual-screen 
devices that appear to open like a book.177 Ross “contended that Apple had 
systematically searched for abandoned and discarded ideas to patent and 
exploit,”178 and that Apple’s various products “were substantially similar to 
his drawings of the Device and embodied its ‘non-functional aesthetic look 
and feel.’”179 In the complaint, Ross included multiple reproductions of a 
quote attributed to the former chief executive officer of Apple, Steve Jobs, 
“Good artists copy, great artists steal. We have always been shameless about 
stealing great ideas.”180 
After the district court dismissed Ross’s claims and denied leave to 
amend his complaint,181 Ross appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which issued 
a per curiam opinion falling within the author’s examined time frame, 
 
 175. Id. at 21. 
 176. Id. at 2. 
 177. See id. at 9–10. 
 178.  Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988, at *1 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.). 
 179. Id., quoting Complaint at 12, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 
8808769, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016). 
 180. Complaint at Exhibit D.6, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 
8808769 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016). 
 181. Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 8808769, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
30, 2016). 
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affirming the lower court’s dismissal of Ross’s claims and briefly discussing 
the conceptual separability analysis.182 
2. Analysis of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
As a preliminary matter, the author submits this case adds little to the 
discourse on Star Athletica given (1) the plaintiff’s lack of presenting much 
direct comparison between specific works and due to his alleging general 
infringement of his ideas and (2) the court’s mistaken application of the 
conceptual separability analysis. On the first point, it is well-established that 
copyright cannot protect ideas.183 In rejecting Ross’s claims, the Eleventh 
Circuit wrote: 
 
The idea for the Device was not subject to copyright protection; each 
element of the drawing that he identified was purely functional and 
inseparable from the idea of a handheld electronic reading device. 
None of those elements can be conceived as a work of art separate 
from the Device itself but are necessary parts of it.184 
 
However, Apple owns design patents on some aesthetic features of its 
devices, which demonstrates that electronic devices like Apple’s may have 
non-functional features (as design patents cannot protect utilitarian features 
any more than copyright law can).185 It is just that such aesthetic features, 
even if separable, may not be sufficiently original to merit copyright 
protection.186 Here, the court held no features were even conceptually 
separable.187 
Further, the Supreme Court’s test does not require examining whether 
any elements of a work “are necessary parts of it,”188 as the Eleventh Circuit 
here wrote, but rather whether any features “(1) can be perceived as a two- 
or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) 
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on 
 
 182. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *1. 
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea. . . .”). 
 184. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3. 
 185. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further 
discussion of design patents falls outside the scope of this article. 
 186. See UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017) and discussion infra at Section IV(C)(2). 
 187. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3. 
 188. Id. 
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its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful 
article.”189 
Finally, the author submits that this case is another that falls through the 
trap door Justice Ginsburg identified–the court need not have addressed 
conceptual separability at all in this case. Similar to how in Star Athletica 
the cheerleader outfit designs were two-dimensional works “reproduced on 
useful articles” not “designs of useful articles,”190 here, the author posits that 
Ross’s works constituted drawings of useful articles, not useful articles 
themselves. 
Query whether drawings can ever be useful articles. To examine the 
question and the importance of Justice Ginsburg’s distinction in this case, 
and in other cases discussed infra,191 the author invites the reader to refer to 
the statute’s definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”: 
 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural 
plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects 
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, 
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects 
of the article.192 
 
While the definition of PGS works contemplates that a work separated 
from a useful article may be a PGS work, the author submits that a useful 
article may not be two-dimensional. The statute defines a useful article as 
“an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray 
the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is 
normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’”193 
The author submits that a drawing of a useful article has no intrinsic 
utilitarian function aside from portraying the appearance of the article or 
 
 189. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017). 
 190. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 191. See Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018); see also infra Section III(H); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB 
Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017); see also infra Section IV(C)(3). 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 193. Id. 
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conveying information. It follows that a drawing of a useful article is not 
itself a useful article, but only a drawing potentially eligible for copyright 
protection as a pictorial or graphic work. As in Star Athletica, “[b]ecause the 
owner of a copyright in a pre-existing PGS work may exclude a would-be 
infringer from reproducing that work on a useful article, there is no need to 
engage in any separability inquiry to resolve” the case.194 
Accordingly, the court in Ross need only have examined whether 
Apple’s devices or two-dimensional depictions of its devices infringed 
Ross’s copyright rights in his drawings, to the extent the court found that 
Ross sufficiently stated a claim. 
H. Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc. 
1. Background 
As with the Ross case above, the author submits that Glass Egg Digital 
Media v. Gameloft, Inc. adds little to the discourse on Star Athletica. 
However, due to the Northern District of California’s citation of Star 
Athletica in its brief mention of separability,195 this case meets the author’s 
criteria for inclusion in this article. 
Glass Egg Digital Media (“Glass Egg”) filed suit in the Northern 
District of California against the defendants, alleging copyright infringement 
of three-dimensional digital car models for use in a series of video games 
under the name Asphalt.196 Glass Egg did not include any images of the 
digital car models at issue in its complaint or any other filings before the 
court. 
Essentially, Glass Egg alleged that its employees moonlighted for 
defendants to create the digital car models, using Glass Egg’s resources, and 
so Glass Egg claimed copyright ownership of the works under the work made 
for hire doctrine.197 However, Judge Chesney held that Vietnamese copyright 
law applied as to ownership of the works because the works were created by 
Vietnamese nationals in Vietnam (i.e., the Glass Egg employees).198 
Vietnamese copyright law evidently differs from U.S. copyright law at least 
with regard to the work made for hire doctrine. Under Vietnamese law, “[a]n 
 
 194. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 195. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 
 196. Complaint at 1, Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 
3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 
 197. Glass Egg Dig. Media, 2018 WL 3659259, at *2. 
 198. Id. at *3. 
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organization that assigns a duty of creating a work to an author, who is its 
employee, shall be the owner of the [work].”199 
Here, because Glass Egg did not assign the duty to its employees, and 
rather alleged that its employees “clandestinely” created the works for 
defendants, Judge Chesney held that Glass Egg did not own the works as 
works made for hire.200 
As to Glass Egg’s conclusory statement that it also owned the works 
via written agreements, Judge Chesney held the pleading deficient, as 
Vietnamese law requires certain specified terms for a copyright assignment 
to be effective, and Glass Egg did not allege the requisite contractual 
terms.201 However, Judge Chesney allowed leave to amend.202 
Considering the possibility that Glass Egg might cure the deficient 
pleading, Judge Chesney continued her analysis on the infringement issue.203 
The parties and the judge agreed United States law governed the scope of 
protection and therefore infringement.204 Glass Egg alleged infringement of 
two categories of works, “polygon arrangements” and “special effects.”205 
Judge Chesney essentially dismissed the infringement of special effects 
claim as speculative, particularly in light of Glass Egg’s failure to include 
any images of the special effects and their use in the Asphalt games.206 
2. Discussion of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability 
As for the polygon arrangements, Glass Egg contended that they met 
the copyright law’s originality requirement and, citing Star Athletica, that 
they “can be separated from the shape and appearance of the cars.”207 Judge 
Chesney held that Glass Egg sufficiently alleged the polygon arrangements 
constituting cars were sufficiently original, “[a]ssuming the polygon 
arrangements can be separated from the shape and appearance of the cars . . 
. .”208 
Glass Egg and Judge Chesney appear to have misapplied the Star 
Athletica language in an attempt to distinguish the present case from 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *4. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *4–6. 
 206. Id. at *5–6. 
 207. See id. at *4 (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)). 
 208. Glass Egg Dig. Media, 2018 WL 3659259, at *5. 
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Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.209 The Tenth Circuit in 
Meshwerks held that digital computer model replicas of Toyota cars, which 
“were two-dimensional wire-frame depictions of Toyota’s vehicles that 
appeared three-dimensional on screen,” were not sufficiently original 
because they did not depict any original expression like lighting, shading, or 
background.210 The Tenth Circuit in Meshwerks made no mention of 
conceptual separability and did not describe the computer models as useful 
articles.211 
Query whether computer models can be useful articles. As with the two-
dimensional drawings in Ross, the author submits that the two-dimensional 
digital renderings of the cars in Glass Egg Digital Media did not constitute 
useful objects per se. The fact that the digital models appear to be three-
dimensional on-screen does not change them from drawings into useful 
articles. The drawings have no intrinsic utilitarian function aside from 
portraying the appearance of the article or conveying information.212 
Therefore, the author posits that the court erred in citing Glass Egg’s 
brief arguing that the polygon arrangements “can be separated from the 
shapes and appearance of the cars” because computer models are not useful 
articles. They are drawings of useful articles, which the author submits lend 
themselves more to an originality analysis (as in Meshwerks) and not a 
conceptual separately analysis. 
IV. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS AFTER 
STAR ATHLETICA 
A. Overview and Background 
1. Procedure and Standards of the Copyright Office Review Board 
The CORB reviews second requests for reconsideration of rejected 
copyright applications.213 In other words, copyright claimants reach the 
CORB as a third stop in the application process. 
First, procedurally, a copyright claimant files an application to register 
copyright in a work or collection of works. A Registration Specialist will 
examine and may reject the application. If rejected, the claimant may file an 
appeal, otherwise known as a request for reconsideration, following the 
 
 209. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 210. Id. at 1261, 1265–66 (analogizing to copyrightable aspects of matter contained in photographs). 
 211. See id. 
 212. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (defining “useful article”). 
 213. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1704.2 (3d 
ed. 2017). 
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proper format.214 An Attorney-Advisor at the Copyright Office reviews the 
first appeal de novo.215 If the Attorney-Advisor maintains the Registration 
Specialist’s rejection of the claimant’s application, the claimant may file a 
second request for reconsideration, following the proper format.216 The 
CORB refers to the initial examination by the Registration Specialist and the 
first appeal as the “Registration Program.”217 The CORB reviews second 
requests for reconsideration de novo.218 
If applicants wish to review CORB rejections, they may do so in federal 
court.219 A federal court may review the CORB’s decision under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, determining whether it holds such decision to 
be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”220 
Commentators note the Copyright Office typically treats applications 
more harshly in its originality analyses as compared to courts.221 
Accordingly, the below CORB decisions contrast with the federal court 
decisions above in certain respects. For example, the CORB decisions 
typically feature analysis of originality, whereas courts may rule on 
separability without reaching the issue of originality.222 
2. Methodology of Decisions Reviewed 
The Copyright Office publishes decisions of the CORB on its 
website.223 To obtain the relevant results for this article, the author searched 
for decisions on the Copyright Office’s website, using the checkbox feature 
to limit results to those involving the category “useful article.” Next, the 
author reviewed only those decisions dated between March 22, 2017 and 
mid-October 2018 to examine those issued in the first eighteen months post-
Star Athletica. The search revealed the following eight decisions. In these 
 
 214. 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(b)(1) (2017); COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1703.1. 
 215. COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1703.2. 
 216. 37 C.F.R. § 1704.1; COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1704.1. 
 217. See COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1704.1. 
 218. Id. § 1704.2. 
 219. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.(2000); 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(4) (2017); COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1706. 
 220. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 221. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines, 
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-of-
copyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal 
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the 
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”). 
 222. See, e.g., Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017); see also 
Section III supra. 
 223. REVIEW BOARD LETTERS ONLINE, https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/ 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
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eight decisions, the CORB reversed five refusals and affirmed three refusals 
of copyright applications. 
 
 B. Refusals Reversed in the First Eighteen Months After Star 
Athletica 
1. Trilliane Strand 
The present case and the following case involve Swarovski Lighting’s 
copyright applications for fixtures comprised of a light fixture with 
decorative crystal details. In Trilliane Strand, the CORB reversed the 
Registration Program’s refusal to register the crystal crown and a curtain of 
crystals on a lighting feature, determining the crystal crown and curtain of 
crystals constitute an artistic feature separable from the overall light fixture, 
























Swarovski, for its part, did “not claim copyright in the overall shape or 
industrial design of the Trillane Strand,” as it excluded “the internal wiring, 
 
 224. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3 (July 27, 2017). 
 225. Id. at 2. 
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ceiling mounting mechanism, [and] lighting component or light bulbs,” and 
it did claim copyright in the “artistic expression reflected in the sculptural 
features of the work.”226 Accordingly, the CORB reversed the Registration 
Program’s refusal to register the crystal crown and curtain of crystal strands, 
finding the three-dimensional features “can be perceived as a freestanding 
work of art that does not recreate the light fixture when imaginatively 
removed from the useful article” and finding the work sufficiently original 
under Feist.227 
2. Amaca 
As in Trillane Strand, the CORB in Amaca reversed the Registration 
Program’s refusal to register Swarovski’s crystal mesh hammocks on a 
lighting feature, determining the crystal mesh hammocks adorning a lighting 
fixture constituted an artistic feature separable from the overall lighting 










 226. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 2; Letter from Shanna Sanders, Rothenberg Farley & Mesiti 
P.C. to U.S. Copyright Office at 2 (Mar. 9, 2016); Letter from Shanna Sanders, Rothenberg Farley & 
Mesiti P.C. to U.S. Copyright Office at 3 (Oct. 6, 2016) (emphasis in original). 
 227. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 228. Amaca, CORB Decision at 2 (July 27, 2017). 
 229. Id. at 1. 
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Swarovski sought only to protect the separable “crystal mesh 
hammocks” on the lighting fixture.230 The CORB found such features “can 
be perceived as a freestanding work of art that does not recreate the light 
fixture when imaginatively removed from the useful article” and found the 
work sufficiently original under Feist.231 
3. Wanderer 
In Wanderer, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s refusal to 
register a complex placement of lace patternwork on a kimono, determining 
that such lacework can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art 
separate from the kimono.232 
Specifically, the design consisted of “the placement of vertical strips of 
lace, ‘the use of three different flower designs,’ ‘the arrangement of one row 
of one flower design, followed by six rows of another flower design, all 
interspersed with a third, smaller flower design,’ and ‘the inconsistency in 
the shape of the bottom trim of the kimono.’”233 
The CORB noted the applicant “Sisco does not seek copyright 
protection for the overall kimono . . . .”234 In contrast, consider the owner of 
the copyright registration for the hookah water container, Inhale, which 
failed to identify any particular aspect of its work and instead claimed 
copyright in the work as a whole.235 However, it is well established that 
clothing is a useful article.236 Therefore, it follows that copyright can only 
protect separable elements and not the clothing item as a whole. 
The CORB held that the “relatively complex placement of lace 
patternwork can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art separate from 
the kimono; it is thus separable.”237 Then, the CORB cited to Star Athletica 
in further noting that the separable features “do not recreate the kimono when 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363. 
 232. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 1 (Nov. 28, 2017). 
 233. Id. (quoting Letter from Andrew Simpson, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear LLP, to U.S. 
Copyright Office at 3 (July 25, 2016) accord Letter from Juliana M. Simon, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & 
Bear, LLP, to U.S. Copyright Office at 2–3 (May 2, 2017)). Note the decision did not include a picture 
of the work. 
 234. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 1. 
 235. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017). 
 236. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991); U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017); see 
also 11 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 924.3(A) (2018). But see 
supra Section III(F). 
 237. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2. 
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so imaginatively removed,”238 and as in Star Athletica, “imaginatively 
removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in 
another medium would not replicate the uniform itself.”239 
After analyzing the separability issue, the CORB addressed originality. 
The CORB clarified that the individual elements in the lacework, such as 
flowers and honeycomb patterns, “are preexisting elements not individually 
protectable under copyright law” and are “standard elements.”240 
Accordingly, the CORB held that the combination of features in the work 
merited thin protection.241 
4. Pendant Lamp – 76 
In Pendant Lamp – 76, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s 
refusal to register a glass, bisected globe lamp with two imbedded filaments 
as a sculptural work.242 The lamp housed an LED bulb that the CORB 





 238. Id. 
 239. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017). 
 240. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2. 
 241. Id. See also Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that “thin” copyright 
protection protects against only virtually identical copying). 
 242. Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018). 
 243. Id. at 3. 
 244. Id. at 1-2. 
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The applicant could not convince the Registration Program in its initial 
appeal letters that the rest of the lamp contained separable authorship. The 
CORB noted that “the second rejection letter pre-dated the Supreme Court’s 
Star Athletica decision by three weeks.”245 In analyzing the work, even 
though the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s determination, the 
CORB emphasized that “[t]he Star Athletica decision did not change the fact 
that copyright law does not protect useful articles as such,” but stated the 
Supreme Court’s decision “clarifies” the test.246 The CORB then reproduced 
the two-part test in its entirety.247 
Applying the test, the CORB found the “glass sculpture and imbedded 
filaments meet the test” and “the Work’s three-dimensional design of glass 
formed into a half globe and imbedded with filament wires can be perceived 
as a standalone work of art without the internally mounted LED that makes 
the Work a useful article.”248 Then, “significantly,” the CORB found the 
separable elements sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.249 
The author agrees with the CORB’s decision except with regard to the 
filaments, where the author submits that the CORB should have obtained 
additional information from the applicant. The CORB noted that the 
“internally-mounted LED is included to illuminate the globe and 
filaments,”250 which presents the query whether the filaments themselves 
light up along with the LED bulb, such as with fiber optic cables. 
If the filaments do light up, are they useful, or decorative? The court in 
Jetmax held the string lights were functional, aside from the decorative 
covers, because they provide light to a room.251 But, fiber optic cables only 
light up if a light shines through them. Accordingly, the author submits that 
the better view is that the filaments, if like the fiber optic kind, are more like 
the potentially protectable decorative covers than the unprotectable light 
bulb, and should not be considered functional. 
However, if the filaments do not light up but simply constitute exposed 
wiring to power and light the LED bulb, the CORB should have considered 
the wiring functional and ineligible for copyright protection, as the wiring 
provides the utilitarian function of delivering electricity to the LED bulb. 
 
 245. Id. at 2. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2–3. 
 248. Id. at 3. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1. 
 251. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 2017). 
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Therefore, the author submits that the CORB should have requested 
additional information from the applicant about the filaments. 
5. Floor Liner 
In Floor Liner, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s refusal 
to register a black floor liner shaped to fit the floor of a vehicle as a sculptural 
work.252 The CORB described the floor liner as a quadrilateral with a top 
surface as “embossed with a pattern of various raised, non-standard 






















The applicant did not seek copyright protection for “the overall floor 
liner,” which it acknowledged as a useful article, but rather sought to register 
the “decorative raised pattern comprising various shapes and orientations,” 
which it asserted served no useful function.255 The CORB seemed to consider 
quite important and took pains to emphasize that, in making its decision, it 
 
 252. Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018). 
 253. Id. at 1. 
 254. Id. at 2. 
 255. Id. 
  
100 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 18:1 
took the applicant at its word that the particular pattern served no useful 
function.256 
Confusingly, although the applicant applied to register a sculptural (i.e., 
three-dimensional) claim in the work, the CORB applied the Star Athletica 
test and declared that “the Work’s raised, decorative pattern of various 
shapes can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art separate from the 
floor liner.”257 Further, the CORB found the design sufficiently original as 
to merit copyright protection.258 
Query what it means for the applicant’s registration that the CORB 
found only the raised, decorative pattern separable as a two-dimensional 
work of art. Did the CORB mean three-dimensional? Does the work become 
registered as a two-dimensional work or a three-dimensional sculptural 
work? The author’s search on the Copyright Office website yielded a 
registration record VA0002101719 for a work of the visual arts titled “Floor 
Liner” and having the copyright claimant Quadratec, Inc., the same entity 
appealing the rejection here.259 While it appears to the author that the CORB 
transformed the applicant’s sculptural claim into a claim for solely the two-
dimensional pattern, it also appears to the author that the Registration Policy 
and Practice division registered three-dimensional sculptural features of the 
work, if the registration record refers to the same work.  The Copyright 
Office’s notes in the registration record state, “Basis for Registration: 
Sculptural features identified separately from and capable of existing 
independently of the utilitarian aspects of a useful article.”260 
On the one hand, the applicant acknowledged that “grooves and lines 
on the surface of a floor liner, in general, do serve the useful function of 
trapping dirt and water,”261 and yet on the other hand, the CORB found that 
the particular pattern here served no useful purpose.262 Query whether the 
three-dimensional grooves serve a useful function but the two-dimensional 
pattern does not. 
 
 256. Id. at 3 (“On the basis of Quadratec’s representation that this pattern serves a purely aesthetic 
purpose, the Board concludes that the decorative pattern is a separable, non-useful work.”). 
 257. Id. (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Copyright Office Public Catalog, https://cocatalog.loc.gov/ (search for “Floor Liner” as Title) 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 2. 
 262. See Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 3. 
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C. Refusals Affirmed in the First Eighteen Months After Star 
Athletica 
1. Pizza Slice Pool Float 
In Pizza Slice Pool Float, the CORB affirmed the Registration 
Program’s refusal to register a two-dimensional design of a slice of 
pepperoni pizza on a three-dimensional inflatable pool float as not 














The applicant initially applied for the Pizza Slice Pool Float as a 
sculptural work, noting the raised crust in the float and divots across the float 
itself, but in the course of prosecution, appears to have amended its claims 
to simply the two-dimensional design itself.265 While not specifically holding 
that the pizza design was separable from the three-dimensional utilitarian 
pool float, the CORB focused on the originality analysis, holding, “[t]he 
level of creative authorship involved in its configuration of elements is, at 
best, de minimis, and too trivial to enable copyright registration.”266 
The CORB acknowledged that the Copyright Office and the courts have 
considered combinations of simple shapes, “when combined in a distinctive 
manner indicating some ingenuity,” to be protectable.267 Still, in this case, 
the CORB found the work “a very common version” of a pepperoni pizza 
slice, and as such, the work was not original, noting further, “the fact that 
 
 263. Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 1 (July 11, 2017). 
 264. Id. at 2. 
 265. Id. at 5. 
 266. Id. at 8. 
 267. Id. (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
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BigMouth had many stylistic choices and design alternatives open to it does 
not factor into the calculus of originality.”268 
However, the author queries whether a federal court would have 
allowed the separable two-dimensional pizza design to receive “thin” 
protection; the author posits that the Copyright Office should have allowed 
“thin slice” protection, though perhaps not “deep dish” protection.269 
 
2. UR5 
In UR5, the CORB affirmed the Registration Program’s refusal to 
register a robotic arm as a sculptural work, determining the arm did not 
contain any separable, copyrightable features that contain the requisite 
originality.270 The robotic arm consisted of two metal tubes with blue plastic 
caps at the joints. The joints featured the Universal Robots logo. See an 














Universal Robots offered, among other arguments, that it was inspired 
by the Danish Modern artistic movement. In contrast to some courts, the 
CORB reiterated, “[t]he attractiveness of a design, the espoused intentions 
 
 268. Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 6. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM 
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 310.8 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing design alternatives). But see 
COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 313.3(B) (discussing the merger doctrine, which prohibits protecting expression 
that “would effectively accord protection to the idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery itself”). Generally, design alternatives appear relevant for the 
infringement analysis as related to merger, but not for the copyrightability analysis. 4 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(3) (2018) (discussing the merger 
doctrine; Nimmer and many courts take the view that the merger doctrine applies as a defense to 
infringement rather than as part of the copyrightability analysis). 
 269. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that “thin” copyright 
protection protects against only virtually identical copying). 
 270. UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017). 
 271. Id. 
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of the author, the design’s visual effect or its symbolism, the time and effort 
it took to create, or the design’s commercial success in the marketplace are 
not factors in determining whether a design is copyrightable.”272 Such 
language mirrors guidance from Star Athletica and its list of do’s and 
don’ts.273 
The CORB expressed doubts that the plastic caps and T-shaped piece 
“could be visualized as works of authorship separate and independent from 
the Work’s utility.”274 In other words, the caps themselves were functional. 
In addition, the CORB stated that even if the CORB considered the plastic 
caps and T-shaped piece artistic and separable, they were not sufficiently 
original.275 The caps themselves consisted of simple shapes and the logo on 
the caps consisted of simple shapes and letters.276 
The Copyright Office’s refusal to register many designs based on its 
considering simple shapes not copyrightable has wide-reaching 
repercussions for copyright claimants’ ability to prevent unauthorized 
copying. This case demonstrates the important interplay between the 
conceptual separability analysis and the originality analysis. 
 
3. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show 
In Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014, the CORB affirmed the Registration 
Program’s refusal to register a three-dimensional trade show booth applied 
for by Team One Display Services Inc. (“Team One”).277 In the CORB’s 
words, the work consisted of “a three-dimensional trade show booth 
comprised of multiple display elements, including two kiosks, two seating 
areas, and a vehicle-display platform.”278 The decision showed multiple 
images from the application, depicting the trade show booth from multiple 







 272. Id. at 5. 
 273. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013–15 (2017). 
 274. UR5, CORB Decision at 5. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 
906.1 (common geometric shapes not copyrightable) and § 906.2 (familiar symbols and designs or mere 
variations thereof not copyrightable) (3d ed. 2017). 
 277. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 2. 
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Team One had argued that “‘the design or appearance of the trade show 
booth is a 3-dimensional work of artistic craftsmanship’ that is conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the trade show booth”280 and that 
“the overall trade show booth could be ‘visualized as a free-standing 
sculpture or statuette . . . .”281 
However, the CORB highlighted that Team One “repeatedly 
suggest[ed]” in its appeals “that the trade show booth [was] a ‘useful 
article,’” though it did “not identify any particular three-dimensional features 
that could stand on their own as works of art apart from the trade show 
booth.”282 Moreover, Team One never responded to a letter from the CORB 
asking to clarify whether Team One sought to protect a “full-size three 
dimensional version of the trade show booth,” a model replica, or the two-
dimensional images submitted as the deposit copy.283 Accordingly, the 
CORB proceeded to evaluate the work as a full-size three-dimensional 
display and reviewed whether it contained any conceptually separable 
portions that could qualify for copyright protection. 
The CORB disregarded the logos and designs on the trade show booth, 
stating that Team One did not seek to register “any two-dimensional 
authorship in the graphics applied to the surface of the trade-show booth 
structure.”284 Interestingly, the CORB appears to have reviewed (apparently 
sua sponte) Team One’s website, “which advertises the ability to apply 
‘custom graphics’” to its displays.285 Based on the CORB’s review of Team 
One’s website, the CORB noted that Team One’s client and not Team One 
appeared to own the two-dimensional graphics depicted in the deposit 
material, and suggested Team One would not be able to claim copyright in 
material it did not own.286 
Further, the CORB stated the Copyright Office “must focus on the 
fixed, expressive elements” of the work to be registered.287 Confusingly, the 
CORB decision highlighted that Team One “made clear that it is attempting 
to claim the work as a single work, rather than a collection of component 
works” in its application,288 but later, the CORB quoted Team One as stating, 
 
 280. Id. at 3 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office (May 20, 2016)). 
 281. Id. at 9 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office, at 2 (May 20, 2016)). 
 282. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 8. 
 283. Id. at 3–4. 
 284. Id. at 7. 
 285. Id. at 7 n.2. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 7. 
 288. Id. at 1. 
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“[t]he design concept consists of original combinations, positioning, and 
arrangement of materials . . . .”289 
The CORB rejected any possible protection for ideas or “unprotectable 
interior design concepts” as insufficiently fixed to merit copyright 
protection.290 Query whether the outcome may have been different if Team 
One described or defined “design concepts” instead as “concrete expressions 
of design concepts.” In the author’s view, the CORB interpreted “concepts” 
to mean “ideas,” and it is well-established that ideas are unprotectable under 
copyright law.291 
Finally, applying the Supreme Court’s test from Star Athletica, the 
CORB held that the three-dimensional trade show booth did not contain any 
conceptually separable, copyrightable features.292 For example, “[t]he 
kiosks, if removed from the overall trade show booth, are still useful articles. 
. . . The same is true of the Work’s vehicle display platform, television 
monitors, stanchions, and seating areas.”293 The CORB left open the 
possibility that some of the work’s details could be copyrightable.294 Without 
more information, because Team One had not responded to the CORB’s 
inquiry about certain features, the CORB presumed that all features were 
“utilitarian aspects of the useful article itself.”295 
What strikes the author as somewhat strange is that the work at issue 
here does not look like a physical structure but instead looks like a two-
dimensional computer-generated display that appears as three-dimensional 
on screen.296 The CORB noted that it interpreted the work as a “full-size 
three-dimensional display” in the absence of any clarifying information from 
the applicant. However, again it strikes the author that the CORB could have 
rejected the application as incorrectly describing the work as three-
dimensional, or alternatively could have interpreted the application as a 
claim to register the work as a collection of two-dimensional images of the 
trade show booth setup.297 
 
 289. Id. at 7 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office at 1–2 (May 20, 2016)). 
 290. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 7–8 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
 291. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea [or] . . . concept . . . .”). 
 292. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 6 & 9. 
 293. Id. at 8. 
 294. Id. at 9. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding computer model replicas of Toyota vehicles not sufficiently original to merit copyright 
protection; no discussion of conceptual separability); see also discussion supra Sections III(G)–(H). 
 297. See Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (apparently transforming the applicant’s 
application to register a sculptural claim in a work into a claim for a two-dimensional design) and 
discussion supra Section IV (B)(5). 
 
2019 COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CONCEPTUALLY SEPARABLE 107 
The author submits that the CORB should have rejected the applicant’s 
characterization of the computer model as a “useful article.” The statute 
defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function 
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.”298 Here, the computer model performs the function of 
portraying the appearance of the article, the trade show booth, and 
accordingly should not be considered a useful article. Instead, as the author 
submits should have been the case as well in Ross and Glass Egg Digital 
Media, the CORB should only consider whether the computer model was 
sufficiently original.299 
V. CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF CONCEPTUAL 
SEPARABILITY 
What analyses and trends provide useful guideposts for applicants and 
litigators? First, despite some subsequent lower courts ignoring the Supreme 
Court’s instructions, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion specifically abrogates 
any tests incorporating physical separability, the usefulness of any “left 
behind” part of the object, and consideration of artistic judgment or 
marketability.300 Lower courts and the CORB indicate it is helpful (but 
generally not necessary) when litigants identify particular features to be 
protected.301 
Pulling together decisions from the first eighteen months post-Star 
Athletica, we see the judge can make an independent determination about the 
features to be protected,302 some part of the utilitarian object must be left 
behind after separability,303 and physical separability rules the day as perhaps 
 
 298. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 299. See Meshwerks, Inc., 528 F.3d at 1258; see also supra Sections III(G)–(H). Cf. U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 919 (3d ed. revised Sept. 29, 2017) 
(discussing copyrightability of physical models). 
 300. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013–14 (2017). 
 301. Compare Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017) (no identification of specific features to be protected) with Lego 
A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 21, 2017) (no identification of specific features to be protected). See also Wanderer, CORB Decision 
at 1 (Nov. 28, 2017); Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 2 (July 27, 2017); Amaca, CORB Decision at 2 
(July 27, 2017) (all identifying specific features to be protected). But see UR5, CORB Decision at 2 (Oct. 
23, 2017); Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 2 (July 11, 2017) (both identifying specific features 
to be protected); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (no 
identification of specific features to be protected). 
 302. See Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3; Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6. 
 303. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3; Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 
319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 764 (D.N.J. 2018). 
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more easily, conceptually graspable.304 It follows that if a feature is 
physically separable, it is also conceptually separable (e.g., black trim on 
bikinis, light covers and sconces on lights). The trickier cases involve 
conceptual separability of more integrated designs.305  In a sense, the 
prohibition on registering copyright in useful articles, though prohibited by 
statute,306 is a kind of “merger.”307 
Copyright owners and litigants may consider Judge Forrest’s “primary 
purpose” test to help demonstrate that a feature is “primarily” decorative or 
artistic rather than functional, though the test is not binding on the CORB or 
any court at this point.308 The “primary purpose” test may help to protect 
some decorative features that also provide some utility. However, such a test 
will not protect anything courts or the CORB consider useful as a whole, like 
the Brandir bike rack or Inhale’s hookah water container,309 or with 
potentially separable portions they consider not sufficiently original, like the 
UR5 robot arm.310 Alternatively or in addition, litigants may enter Judge 
Myerscough’s rhetorical realm of beat poetry by asking “once the 
[decorative feature] / is removed from the [functional portion] / what is the 
usefulness / of [e.g., hanging the bird on a string by its beak]?”311 
While litigants must currently look elsewhere to protect useful articles 
without conceptually separable parts, it is worth mentioning that copyright 
law does protect some types of works we may consider useful, if not 
constituting true “useful articles.”312 For example, copyright can protect 
dictionaries, computer programs, and architecture.313 However, copyright 
 
 304. See Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017); Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., 
No. 16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017). 
 305. See Silvertop Assocs. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 760; Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 
19, 2018). 
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 307. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(3) (2018) 
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Nimmer and many courts take the view that the merger doctrine applies as a defense to infringement 
rather than as part of the copyrightability analysis). 
 308. See Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6. See supra Section III(D) for further discussion. 
 309. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Inhale Inc., 
2017 WL 4163990, at *3. 
 310. UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017). 
 311. See Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *3 (C.D. Ill. June 
20, 2017) (virgules added). As above, the author credits Thomas Kjellberg of Cowen, Liebowitz & 
Latman for his interpretation of Judge Myerscough’s words as beat poetry at the Copyright Society of the 
USA’s Annual Meeting in June 2018. 
 312. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added) (defining “useful article”). 
 313. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 102. Credit to Joshua Simmons of Kirkland & Ellis LLP for his 
observation about the protectability of some “useful” works, which he made on a panel where the author 
also presented at the Fordham IP Conference in April 2018. 
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law treats PGS works differently.314 When the Copyright Office and 
Congress consider the Next Great Copyright Act,315 they should consider 
why, and take the opportunity to clarify the conceptual separability test to 
include Judge Forrest’s “primary purpose” language to more clearly 
delineate what artistic features copyright owners may expect copyright law 
to protect. 
Two-dimensional works and two-dimensional computer models that 
appear on screen as three-dimensional works present special problems, but 
the author submits litigants and copyright applicants may better analyze 
them outside of the conceptual separability framework. Such works can 
reproduce the appearance of useful articles but are not themselves useful 
articles.316 Congress should also clarify the definition of “useful article” in 
the statute in this regard and the Copyright Office may address the issue in 
its next revision of the Compendium as well.  In the meantime, and for works 
of all kinds, litigants should heed Justice Ginsburg’s implied guidance to 
carefully consider the nature of the work at issue to determine, as a threshold 
matter, whether the work constitutes a useful article at all.317 
Finally, litigants will do well to remember the originality analysis, 
though courts may elect to rule only on separability without considering 
originality.318 Also, the CORB and the Copyright Office certainly consider 
originality in determining registrability.  As mentioned above, the Copyright 
Office appears to hold applicants to a higher standard of originality as 
compared to federal courts.319 Of course, sometimes courts, particularly 
those inclined towards high art artistic judgment, use high standards for 
originality as well.320 
 
 314. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 113. 
 315.  See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013); see 
also The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intell. Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4–38 (2013) (statement of 
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, the U.S. Copyright Office). 
 316. See supra Sections III(G)–(H), IV(C)(3). 
 317. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018-19 (2017) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring); see also supra Section II(C)(1).  In the author’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg was smart to 
concur rather than dissent so her opinion carries more persuasive authority for future cases. 
 318. See, e.g., Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6. 
 319. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines, 
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-of-
copyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal 
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the 
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”). 
 320. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491–92 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
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Decisions coming out of the CORB indicate that the originality analysis 
closely follows, though is separate from, analyzing a useful article’s 
separable parts for separability considerations.321 Congress and the 
Copyright Office should clarify that the conceptual separability test does not 
incorporate the originality analysis, as at least one court has conflated the 
two, perhaps due to the particular language of the Supreme Court’s new 
test.322 
While courts have not consistently applied the Supreme Court’s 
guidance, cases from the first eighteen months post-Star Athletica offer 
useful guideposts and guardrails for addressing the copyrightability of 
artistic features of useful articles. Litigants and courts can look at what Star 
Athletica explicitly mandated courts and litigants not consider and can 
review how the CORB implements the separability and originality analyses. 
Also, courts and litigants may look to new tests from lower courts that 
expand upon the Supreme Court’s return to the statutory test, such as Judge 
Forrest’s “primary purpose” test, in order to determine what is “useful” post-
Star Athletica. 
 
 321. See, e.g., Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 3 (Apr. 4, 2018); cf. supra Section II(B) 
(questioning how a work could simultaneously meet the second part of the Supreme Court’s new 
conceptual separability test for the feature to “qualify” as a PGS work and at the same time not satisfy 
the statutory originality requirement). 
 322. See Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 
1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017); see also discussion at Section II(B) supra. 
